There is something strange with Turkey's economic performance nowadays: It's better than it supposed to be.
I had written in the past that the current AKP government was the product of the 2001 economic crisis. Turkey's political landscape had changed with the first election after that crisis, as all parties in the previous parliament were punished by the voters harshly.
The leaders of AKP, the next generation Islamist party that swept to an election victory, made the best decision then, by agreeing to follow up the recovery recipe formulated by the economists of the previous government, namely, the technocrats around Kemal Derviş, a social democratic former head of the United Nations Development Programme who returned to his native country to "rescue" the Turkish economy.
AKP's non-partisan, pragmatic approach had helped them bear the fruits of the outstanding economic growth in recent years. The fruits were obviously their votes that were continuously increasing with each election.
The program which was created by the team of Derviş has come to its end. Now the new program is up to AKP's own economic team, consisted of officials who are not as half capable as Derviş.
Strangely, though, there are some serious signs of a possible crash, especially about currency, but Turkey's economy is still up and running. It's in better shape than most of the eurozone countries.
How?
Michael Rubin, an American Middle East expert, writes today that
the answer is three words: Foreign direct investment. Rubin points out to "billions of dollars from Persian Gulf states and financiers (which) had flooded into Turkey illegally and appeared to be funding the ruling Islamist party and the pet projects of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan."
I guess that Rubin is right, but as a right-wing opinion-maker in America, he willfully ignores how the transnational finance capital -which was led by the corporate America, hence the White House- has been supporting AKP. There is no indication to convince us that this support had been cut or decreased at any point, including the days of crises between Turkey and Israel.
So my prediction didn't change: AKP didn't face a real challenge yet. In Turkish politics, the one and only challenge is a devastating economic crisis. Such crises have been the only key events to topple governments in the past, excluding military coups.
The day that the transnational finance capital will put a hex on Turkey, AKP's invincible image will be destroyed by up-to-date public surveys. Then, as the hot money flow will also stop, the populist policies that maintain the popular support for AKP will also cease to exist, which will mean a huge drop in the number of votes in the following elections.
To conclude, I must stress out that I may oppose most of AKP's policies, especially the neo-liberal ones, but I don't look forward to the total economic collapse of my country just to get rid of this government. This position can be interpreted as a lesson for the American right, too.
Of course, I have a much more leftist approach, comparing to i.e Tea Party in America, but I do believe that the peoples of the world, the individuals who want to live in a more egalitarian, more democratic, more just, more transparent globe, should unite, whether they are right-wing or left-wing, against the ills of the transnational finance capital which -I believe- drove us to this point: The edge of the cliff that falls down to an abyss.
Those drivers should be held to account.